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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GMW CONSTRUCTION,
A Partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Civil No. 870160-CA

vs
ROBERT WAYNE COX,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction of this Court is founded under Section
78-2a-a, Utah Code Annotated and under Rule 3 of the Rules
of Utah Court of Appeals, as the appeal arises from a final
judgment or order of the Eleventh Circuit Court, and for
Carbon County, State of Utah,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for the collection of money and
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and counterclaim for
damages to personal property.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Complaint was filed and served on or about October 1,
(1)

1985.

Answer and Counterclaim was filed and served on or

about October 17, 1985.

Pre-Trial was had on June 25, 1986

and Order thereon was entered July 9, 1986.

Trial was

had on January 28, 1987 before the Honorable A. John Ruggeri,
Circuit Court Judge.
The Court entered it's Memorandum Decision on February
3, 1987.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

were entered on March 27, 1987.
Appellant filed Notice of Appeal on or about April 27,
1987.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

The trial court found in favor of defendants on their
counterclaim and against Plaintiff on its Complaint and
pursuant to its final order dated March 27, 1987, awarded
judgment in favor of Defendants in the sum of $4,154.83 plus
$725.00 as and for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of
$10.00 for a total of $4,989.83 together with interest at 12%
per annum until paid.
D.

FACTS

[All facts as set forth by Appellant are disputed].
Respondents hired GMW to replace the firebrick and reface
their fireplace which was equipped with a heatilater and was
the only source of heat for their home (TR-59,1.15,16).
Prior to hiring Appellants, Respondents purchased two pallets
of red brick and firebrick (TR-60,1.22,23).
(2)

Appellant contends the contract was for material and
labor.

Respondents contend that contract was for labor only

(TR-63.1.24,25)

and that it was agreed that GMW would

return the red brick that Respondents purchased a
them for rock for a small additional charge

change

(TR-64,1.10»25)•

Appellant contends that the fireplace was "condemned"
(TR-115,1.18,23) but that they were only hired to give
the fi

a

cosmetic face lift (TR-7,1.25, TR-8,1.1).

Appellants' chief witness, Lynn McCourt, is not a
licensed cci

_tor (TR-23,1.3,10),

on the interior of the fireplace

Mr. McCourt did not
(TR-25,1.5).

The size and shape of the firebox was changed by
Appellants (TR-14,1.6) and when they finished the heatilator,
that fit in the old firebox, was to big for the
reconstructed firebox (TR-119, 1.13,17).

Mr. Counsel had

not seen the fireplace in question (TR-119, 1.23,24).
Appellants testimony that Respondents* home was dirty
was rebutted by photographic evidence to the contrary.
(Ex. 29,30,31).
Appellant McCourt 1 s testimony that he moved furniture,
covered the floor and cleaned up following completion of
the job was rebutted by witnesses Cox (TR-66,1.1,13) and Mrs.
Langley

(TR-97,1.10,11).

Mrs. Cox testified that an oak mantle was removed from
the fireplace and taken by GMW (TR-78,1.14,15). Appellants
(3)

claim that the mantle piece was made of plywood and that it
was thrown away (TR-29,1.15,16)•
Mrs. Cox testified that one year prior to the incident
she purchased a Television Set for $596.00 and a coffee table
for $248.00 (TR-67,1.20,22).

There was no objection to

her testimony nor was it rebutted.

She testified that the

television set and table were damaged by flying chips of
cinderblock (TR-67, 1.13) and by the pipe of one of the
workman (TR-66,1.22,25, TR-67,1.1,2).
Appellant McCourt testified that they did in fact break
rock inside the home. (TR-30,1.4,7).
Mrs. Cox testified to damage to her carpet
(TR-68,1.8,18; Ex. 19,20) and her testimony was supported
by Appellant McCourt (TR-16,1.24,25; TR-17,1.1,14)

She

testified that replacement cost was $573.28 (TR-77,1.11,19)
There was no objection to this testimony.
Mrs. Cox testified that, after waiting for two or three
days for the mortar to dry, her husband lit a fire, that the
fireplace would not work and the house was smoke damaged
(TR-70,1.15,23).

This testimony was corroborated by Mr. Cox

(TR-91,1.22,25; TR-92,1.1,6); witness, Langley
(TR-97,1.21,25) and witness Jennings (TR-106,1.12,23,
Ex.10,21.25).

Mr. Cox testified further that cleaning

and painting expenses were over $500.00 (TR-73,1.8,12).

(4)

There were no objections from Appellants' counsel who also
stipulated that evidence of expenses for drapes and curtains
be submitted to the court subject to counsel's right to
to request further hearing (TR-123,1.24,25; TR-124,1.1,25;
TR-125,1.1,4).

Evidence was submitted and there was no

request for further hearing.
Appellant McCourt testified that $3,500.00 was a
minimum amount to reconstruct the fireplace (TR-32,1.6,7)•
Witness, Counsel testified that $4,000.00 "on up" was
the cost to reconstruct (TR-45,1.17,18).
Mrs. Cox testified that at 10:30 P.M. on the night the
fireplace was lighted she called Appellant Gomez, at his home
to advise him of the problem (TR-73,1.13,17) and that within
one week following the completion of the work the mortar was
falling out and cracks were appearing in the fireplace
(TR-78,1.23,25; TR-79,1.1,25; Ex.17,27,18).
Appellant McCourt knew of Respondents' complaints within
one week of completion of the work (TR-58,1.11,12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was, as the Trial Court found, sufficient evidence
to support the Court's decision.
The Court of Appeal is precluded from hearing issues
raised for the first time on appeal.

(5)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY
AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON EVIDENCE PRESENTED,
At trial of the case at bar the Court found from the
evidence that Appellants' work on Respondents' fireplace
caused damage to Respondents' home and personal property.
(Addendum 1,2),
Appellants challenge the Courts findings based
on the fact that there was conflicting testimony and that,
in Appellants' view, their witnesses had more expertise.
Appellants conclude that the evidence was not "substantial"
and did not support the judgment.
The same argument was the issue on appeal in
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P2d 233, (Utah 1983), cited by
Appellant in support of their argument.

The Utah Supreme

Court said in Kinkella:
Plaintiff argues that he presented
irrefutable evidence that defendants
inflated the labor and material costs.
Plaintiff also claims that the trial
court attached insufficient weight to
the testimony of plaintiff's expert.
The trial court heard the witnesses
of both parties first-hand, evaluated
detailed written audits by both sides,
and concluded that plaintiff's evidence
was not as convincing as defendants'
evidence. On appeal we do not retry
(6)

the facts and will not overturn the
trial court's findings of fact if th<
supported by substantial evidence....
[Citations Omitted] at 235.
This standard of review has been refined and expa*
the recent criminal case decided by the Utah Supreme Court
which said:
On January 1, 1987, however, new Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) took
effect, providing:
In all actions tried upon the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusi*
f law thereon, and judgment
shall be ^m.i-ved
pursuant to Rule r ° * *
Findings of fact, whether based on
-. i
or docunu
evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the
y
of the witnesses.....
The language of Rule 52(a) is similar
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Federal case law has defined the standard
of review in the federal rule and Wright
& Miller summarizes that standard as
follows:
[I]t is not accurate to say that the
appellate court takes that view of the
evidence that is most favorable to the
appellee, that it assumes that all
conflicts in the evidence were resolved
in his favor, and that he must be given
the benefit of all favorable inferences.
All of this is true in reviewing a jury
verdict.
It is not true when it is
findings of the court that are being
reviewed.
Instead the appellate court
may examine all of the evidence in the
record.
It will presume that the trial
court relied only on evidence properly
admissible in making its findings in the

(7)

absence of a clear showing to the contrary.
It must give great weight to the findings
made and the inferences drawn by the trial
judge, but it must reject this findings if it
considers them to be clearly erroneous.
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedures, Section 2585(1971)(Citations
Omitted]. [Emphasis Added].1
Appellant in his narration of "fact" and review of
the testimony favorable to his position merely highlights
conflicting testimony and asks this Court to accept his
version as true and disregard the evidence relied upon by
the Trial Court in reaching it's decision.

This approach

was declined by the Utah Supreme Court in Hal Taylor
Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P2d 743, (Utah 1982):
...Where the evidence is in
conflict, we defer to the trial court's
first-hand assessment of the witnesses'
credibility and assume that the trial
court believed those aspects of the
evidence which support its findings.
[Citations Omitted] at 749.
Counterclaimants were competent to testify as to cause
and amount of damage.
The Trial Court in it Memorandum Decision outlined the
findings which supported the Court's decision. (Addendum 7 ) .
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that
lay testimony is admissible if the layman's inferences or
opinions are rationally based on the perception of the
1.

State v. Walker, 64 Utah Adv. Rep.10 (Utah 1987);
c.f., Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P2d 162 (Utah 1981);
Charleston v. Hackett, 360 P2d 176 (Utah 1961);
Dugan v. Jones, 39 Utah Adv. Rep.37 (Utah 1986)
(8)

u

and are helpful to a clear understanding of his

testimony or to a determination of the fact in issue.
(Addendum 3 ) . Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence provid
experts may testify but does not provide for any situation
in which such testimony is mandatory.

(Addendum 3 ) .

In Roods v. Roods, 645 P2d 640, (Utah 1982), tt
Supreme Court held that lay opinion was proper even though
expert testimony would be admissible with respect tc
issue.
In the case at bar, Respondents were in a

n

to observe and perceive their damages; when and h
occurred.
Appellant's witness, Mr. Counsel, had n
fireplace in question. (TR-119,1.23,24).

e

Appellant who

testified regarding said fireplace was not a li'*-^ ^<?d
contractor (TR-23,1.3,10) nor did he work on the
of the fireplace (TR-23,1.21,23).
Respondents were certainly in a better position to
o!
o

he malfunction of the fireplace and the result
d malfunction; as well as the damage to their

ca, ^. ^. and furnishings.
All competent evidence tending
to establish a legitimate item
of damage is, under proper pleadings,
relevant and admissible. Evidence
tending to show the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and
(9)

reasonable inference has been held
admissible where the fact of damage
has been proved, and where, because
of the nature of the case, the
amount of the damages cannot be
estimated with certainty, or only
a part of the damages can be so
estimated, evidence of all the facts
and circumstances of the case have
any legitimate tendency to show the
damages or their probable amount may
be admitted for the purpose of enabling
the trier of the facts to make the most
accurate and probable estimate which
the nature of the case permits.
[Citations Omitted]2
While there are some inherent
qualifications in the rule and
variations of phraseology in its
statement, the general rule supported
in nearly all jurisdictions, in criminal
as well as civil cases, is that an
owner of a chattel, although not
an expert on the subject, is qualified
by the relationship of owner to give
his opinion as to its value. The
primary reason for admitting such
an estimate of value is that of
necessity, the owner necessarily
knowing something about the quality,
cost, and condition of the article,
and it often being impossible to
produce other witnesses having the
requisite knowledge upon which to
base an opinion. But the rule of
admissibility is more frequently
predicated on the presumption that
the owner, being familiar with his
property, knows what it is worth.
It thus appears that familiarity
on the part of the owner with the
chattel involved is a condition
precedent or inherent predicate
to the admission in evidence of a

2.

25 A C.J.S. Damages Section 145,p.27.
(10)

nonexpert owner's opinion as to
value...[Citations Omitted]3
Respondents testified to the amount of damage to their
property.

There was no objection to nor rebuttal of said

testimony.
Rule 301, Utah Rules of Evidence provides follows:
(a)

Effect of erroneous ruling*
Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party
is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the
ruling is one admitting evidence,
a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context; or

Appellants' witnesses testified that $3,500.00 or
$4,000.00 would be the cost of reconstruction of the
fireplace (TR-32,1.6,7) and (TR-45,1.17,18).

Therefore,

the Trial Court's conclusion that $1,500.00 would compensate
for damage to the fireplace was not unreasonable.

The

Court obviously did not believe Appellant McCourt's testimony
that the fireplace mantle in an old home was made of plywood.
The measure of damage to personal property was set
forth; allowing replacement cost as admissible evidence, in
the Utah Court of Appeals decision rendered July 10, 1987,
Ault v. Dubois, 61 Utah Adv.Rep. 35:
3.

31 Am.Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, Section 137,
p.682-683.
(11)

...[C]ost of replacement mayhave been the only evidence
available for the jury in
determining the fair market value
of the destroyed items. And the
desired objective of damages is
ft
to evaluate any loss suffered by
the most direct, practical and
accurate method that can be
employed." [Citing Even Odds, Inc.
v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d
709, 711 (1968).] Moreover, Dubois
did not introduce any other evidence
to prove the fair market value of the
damaged property...
As in Ault, Appellant herein offered no evidence of fair
market value.
In this case, as in Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d
261, 409 P2d 121, (Utah 1965):
The parties have had what they
were entitled to: a full and fair
opportunity to present their contentions
and the evidence supporting them to the
court [and jury]. When this has been
done all presumptions are in favor
of the validity of the [verdict and]
judgment, at 125.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
4
Respondents, the established standard for appellate review,
5
this Court should sustain the decision of the Trial Court
and deny Appellants' request, on appeal, for a new trial.
Although the evidence was disputed and reasonable people
4.
5.

Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P2d 693 (Utah 1982).
McCloud v. Baum, 569 P2d 1125 (Utah 1977); Egbert &
Jaynes v. R.C. Tolman, supra; n.3, citing Charlton v.
Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389; 360 P2d 176, (1961) and URCP
59 (a)(6), Addendum 15,p.l).
(12)

might arrive at different conclusions, the issues were
decided by the Court.

That decision should not be

disturbed on appeal.
POINT II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEAL IS PRECLUDED FROM
ADDRESSING ISSUES NOT RAISED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.
Appellant did not raise the issue of sufficiency
of the evidence at any time during the trial.

It is obvious

that the issue of sufficiency of evidence, if any, would
have been apparent to Appellant at the close of Respondents'
case.

It was not raised.
Appellant now raises the issue of sufficiency of the

evidence for the first time.
The Court has held in Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 682 P2d 832, (Utah 1984):
In order to preserve a contention
of error on appeal, the party
claiming error in admission of
evidence must raise the objection
the trial court in clear and concise
terms and in a timely fashion calculated
to obtain a ruling thereon. Where there
was no clear and definite objection...
that theory cannot now be raised on
appeal
Therefore, we are
precluded from addressing this assertion
of error on the merits, at 837,[citing 6 ] .
6.

U.R.E. 4; Cook Assocs. Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P2d
1161, (1983). State v. Malmrose, Utah 649 P2d 556,
(1982). Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659
P2d 1040, (Utah 1983).
(13)

Barson deals with timely objection to admissibility of
evidence.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held:
"...The rule has been stated over
over again that a party may not
remain silent and take his chance on
a verdict and then, if it is
adverse, complain of some inadequacy
which could have been quite easily
corrected. See Susser v. Wiley,
1944, 350 Pa. 427, 39 A.2d 616;
Rastmus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1949,
164 Pa. Super. 635, 639, 640, 67A. 2d
660; Stadham Co. v. Century Indemnity Co.,
1950, 167 Pa. Super 268, 275, 74 A. 2d
511..." Bodine v. Boyd, 383 Pa. 525, 119
A. 2d 54, 276.

The issues raised on this appeal were or should have
been apparent to Appellant at the close of the trial.
were not raised.

They

Appellants chose to await the decision,

which did not weigh in their favor before raising the issues
on appeal.
Appellants argument in favor of reversal of the decision
below should not be heard.
CONCLUSION
Judgment and Order of the Trial Court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,

1ARIYNN/BENNETT LENA
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS
ROBERT WAYNE COX AND RONI COX
(14)
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Jav of

A D D E N D U M

IN THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
O 0o

GMW CONSTRUCTION,
a partnership,
plaintiff
-vs-

ROBERT WAYNE COX
and RONI COX,
defendants

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The Court makes the following findings of fact:
1.
That the fireplace in question was operational and in use
as the only source of heat at the time plaintiffs undertook repairs.
2.
That the work done by plaintiffs resulted
modification of the fireplace as well as cosmetic
3.
That plaintiffs installation
and the "heatalator" was the direct
the fireplace.

in

structural

and repair of the firebrick
cause of the malfunction of

4.
That plaintiffs in cutting and fitting the rock and masonry
work allowed chips and rock particles to damage the defendants
television set and other furniture pieces.
5.
That plaintiffs removed and destroyed an existing oak mantel
belonging to the defendants.
6.
That plaintiffs faulty construction/alteration
cause of the damages incurred by defendants, as follows:
Damage to TV Tuner and Furniture
Damage to Drapes and Walls
Cleaning and Painting
Repair and Cleaning of Carpet
Oak mantel destroyed
Replacement costs for Fireplace

is the direct

$596.00
620.55
500.00
583.28
325.00
1,500.00

Memorandum of Decision Continued:

7.
That the pre-trial order provided for attorneys
the Court fixes defendants attorneys fees at $725.00.
8.
3<£ each

fees,

and

That plaintiffs returned, for credit, 100 red brick at
for a total of $30.00, which amount belongs to defendants.

The Court makes the following Conclusions of Law:
1.
indicated

That defendants are entitled to judgment
in the findings, together with costs and

2.
That
forthwith.

plaintiffs

lien

is

not

Dated this 3rd day of February, 1987.

valid

and

in the amounts
attorneys fees.

must

be

released

<^A/[axLunn 2D.

J-zma

ATTORNEY AT LAW

1933

246 EAST MAIN STREET
PRICE. UTAH 84501
(8011637-2690
ATTORNEY FOR:

DEFENDANTS
ROBERT WAYNE COX
RONI COX
222 N o r t h 2nd E a s t
P r i c e , U t a h 84501
IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR
PRICE, CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GMW CONSTRUCTION,
A Partnership,

:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs

:

ROBERT WAYNE COX
and RONI COX,

:

Defendants.

:

C i v i l No.

T h i s m a t t e r came on f o r t r i a l on t h e
1987 and P l a i n t i f f was p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t

85-CV-104

8 t h day o f
i n C o u r t and

January,
represented

by C o u n s e l , N i c k S a m p i n o s , and D e f e n d a n t s w e r e p e r s o n a l l y
i n C o u r t a n d r e p r e s e n t e d by C o u n s e l , Marlynn B e n n e t t Lema,

present
and

t h e C o u r t h a v i n g h e a r d t e s t i m o n y and h a v i n g r e c e i v e d e v i d e n c e
being fully

a d v i s e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s and h a v i n g e n t e r e d

Memorandum D e c i s i o n h e r e b y f i n d s a s

follows:

J-tma
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FINDINGS OF FACT

REET
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1.

That t h i s Court has

jurisdiction.

its

and

Page Two
2.

That the Court finds in favor of Defendant on their

Counterclaim and against Plaintiff on their Complaint*
3.

That the fireplace in question was operational and in

use as the only source of heat at the time Plaintiffs undertook
repairs.
4.

That the work done by Plaintiffs resulted in structural

modification of the fireplace as well as cosmetic changes.
5.

That Plaintiffs installation and repair of the firebrick

and the ffheatalatortf was the direct cause of the malfunction of
the fireplace.
6.

That Plaintiffs cutting and fitting the rock and masonry

work allowed chips and rock particules to damage the Defendants
television set and other furniture pieces.
7.

That Plaintiffs removed and destroyed an existing oak

mantle belonging to the Defendants.
8.

That Plaintiffs faulty construction/alteration is the

direct*cause of the damages incurred by Defendants, as follows:
Damage to TV Tuner and Furniture
Damage to Drapes and Walls
Cleaning and Painting
Repair and Cleaning of Carpet
Oak Mantle destroyed
Replacement costs for Fireplace
9.

$

596.00
620.55
500.00
583.28
325.00
1,500.00

That the pre-trial order provided for attorneys fees, and

the Court fixes Defendants attorneys fees at $725.00.
10.
B. JUma
f AT LAW
IN STREET

That Plaintiffs returned, for credit, 100 red brick at

3 cents each for a total of $30.00, which amount belongs to
Defendants.

AH 84501
r-2690

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes as follows:

Page Three
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That Judgment should be awarded as against Plaintiff

and in favor of Defendants in the amount of $4,154.83 plus $725.00
as and for attorney fees and costs b,f Court in the amount of
$10.00 for a total of $4,989.83 same to bear interest at the rate
of 8% per annum until paid.
DATED this J*/ day of February, 1987.

. JOHN RUGGERI
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

5.

Jjtmxx

TLAW
STREET

184501
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ATTORNEY AT LAW

19,33

248 EAST MAIN STREET
PRICE. UTAH 84501
(801)637-2690
ATTORNEY FOR:

DEFENDANTS
ROBERT WAYNE COX
RON I COX
222 N o r t h 2nd E a s t
P r i c e , U t a h 84501
IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR
PRICE, CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GMW CONSTRUCTION,
A Partnership,

O R D E R

Plaintiff,
vs
ROBERT WAYNE COX
and RON I COX,
Defendant.

C i v i l No.

85-CV-104

This ^matter came on for trial on the 28th day of January,
1987 before the Honorable A. John Ruggeri, Circuit Court Judge,
and the Plaintiff was personally present in Court and represented
by Counsel, Nick Sampinos, and Defendants were personally
present in Court and represented by Counsel, Marlynn Bennett Lema,
and the Court having heard testimony and having received evidence
5. Jlima

and being fully advised in the premises and having entered its

TLAW
STREET

Memorandum Decision and having entered its Findings of Fact and

184501
J90

Conclusions of Law, Now Therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That Judgment i s hereby awarded as a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f

and

i n favor of Defendants i n t h e amount of $4,154.8.3 p l u s $725.00
as and f o r a t t o r n e y fees and costs- of Court i n t h e amount of $10. OC
for a t o t a l of $ 4 , 9 8 9 . 8 3 same to b e a r i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e of 8%
p e r annum u n t i l

paid.
DATED t h i s c ^ _ d a y of F e b r u a r y , 1987.
BY THE COURT:
JOHN RUGGERI
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
NICK SAMP IN 05
ATTORNEY FOR7 PLAINTIFF

UTAH C O D E
1*7 1988

Utah Rules of Evidence!

(b) Scope of cross-examination.
Cross-examination should be limited„ fa j the
robject matter of the direct examination and matters
iffecting the credibility of the witness The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry
into additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading questions.
Leading questions should not b e used o n \ the
direct examination of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily
leading questions should be permitted on crossexamination When a party calls a hostile witness,
as adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party, \ interrogation may be by leading
questions.
IULE 6TZ. WRITING U S E D T O REFRESH
MEMORY>
If a witness uses a writing t o refresh his memory
for the purpose of testifying, either
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion
determines it is, necessary in the interests of justice ?
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to crossmmme the witness thereon, and to introduce in
evidence those portions which relate t o the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing
contains matters not related to the subject matter of
the testimony the court shall examine the writing in
camera, excise any portions not so jrelated, and
order delivery o f the remainder t o the party entitled
thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall
be preserved and made available to the appellate,
court \n the event of an appeal. \l 4 writing h 'not
produced or delivered pursuant t o order under this
rule, the court shall make any order justice requires,
except that in criminal cases when, the prosecution^
elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking
the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests o f justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
IULE 613. PRIOR STATEMENTS O F
WITNESSES.
(1) Extmlnlttf witness concerning Prior statement.
(I) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of
witness.

RULE 705t

( i ) Calling by court.
The court may, orj its own motion pr at the) sug->
gestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties ftre
entitled tp cross-examine witnesses thus called
(b) Interrogation by court.
The court may interrogate witnesses, whether*
called by itself or by a party.
(c) Objections.
Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court
or to interrogation by it may be made at the time pr
at the next available opportunity when the jury is
not present.
RULE 615. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES.
* At the request of a party the court shall order
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the tes->
jimony of other witnesses, and it may make the
order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person,
or (2) an officer or employes of a party which Is not
a natural person designated as its representative by
its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is showft
by a party to be essential to the presentation of his
cause.
ARTICLE V n . OPINIONS A N D E X P E R T
TESTIMONY
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Ls;y Witnesses.
Bute 702. Testimony by Experts.
pule 703 Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issnt.
Role 705. Disclosure of Facts or D*t* Underlying Expert
Opinion.
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts,
[ U M ^ O ^ OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAI
^WITNESSES.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inference? which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimonyj>r the determination of a fact in issue.

[ j U L E ^ > T E S T I M O N Y BY EXPERTS.
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knd*
wledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement.
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto' iij
In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the the forth of an opinion or otherwise,
ttatement need not be shown nor its contents disclRULE 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY
osed to him at that time, but on request the same
BY EXPERTS.
shall be shown pr disclosed to opposing counsel
The facts or data in the particular case Upon
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement which an expert bases an opinion or inference, may
be those perceived by pr made known to hiro at or
of witness.
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state- before the hearing. If pf a type reasonably relied
ment by a witness is not admissible unless 'the* upon by experts in the particular field in forming
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or opinions or inferences upon tl>e subject, the facts, qt
deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an, data need not be admissible in evidence.
opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision
does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent
sidelined in Rule 801(d)(2),

IULE 614. CALLING A N D INTERROGATION
OF WITNESSES tyf COURT. ^
„ * , >% A l
WCaUlBi a* c«wf. /fc ^ j , ^ f . ^ , /
+\^it%c\^m,

C0D£*Q>
N*o Utah

RULE 704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue $0 be decided by the frier
of fact.
RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF F ^ C T S OR D A T A
UNDERLYING E X f ERT OPINION.
The expert may testify in terms o f opjnjori o r ,
inference and give his reasons therefor without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless th$*

For Annotations, consult CODE •Co'a Annotation Service
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